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NOTES

Due Process Rights of Parents and
Children in International Child
Abductions: An Examination of the
Hague Convention and its Exceptions
ABSTRACT

Rising divorce rates in recent years have led to increasinglyfrequent abductions of children by one parent away from the other
parent. Often, abductingparents move the children to different jurisdictions in which the parents believe they can obtain a more
favorable decision on custody. To remedy this problem, twenty-nine

nations joined in 1980 to adopt the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This Convention
mandates the immediate return, upon request, of the abducted
child to the state of habitual residence of the child. The Convention
includes several limited exceptions to this mandate, applicable at
the discretion of the judicial body of the requested state in certain
circumstances. The Convention is subject to criticism because the
exceptions focus on the well-being of the abducted child rather than
on the custody rights of the parents. United States laws on child
custody guaranteeparents custody hearings that comport with due
process requirements. The legal systems of other states, however, do
not always provide this basic fairness. This Note examines the Convention, its exceptions, and the judicial applicationof those exceptions. The Author concludes that, although United States Courts
must remain faithful to the Convention's purpose of allowing custody decisions to be made by the state of the child's habitual residence, courts must be willing to invoke the Convention's exceptions
in cases in which the abducting parent will not be given, or has
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not been given, a custody hearing that is consistent with United
States notions of due process.
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INTRODUCTION

The rising divorce rate in the United States and the increased mobility
of the world's population have wreaked havoc in the arena of matrimonial law.' For example, the already difficult situation of a divorce is
complicated for a child when one parent interferes with the custodial
right of the other parent by wrongfully removing the child to a new
jurisdiction. 2 Often, a parent does this in hopes of receiving legal custody
of the child under a different judicial system. Courts have contributed to
the confusion by exercising jurisdiction in custody matters on tenuous
grounds and by modifying custody decrees issued in matters previously

1. Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1989). "While in many situations
the increase in mobility leads to a vitality in society, in the arena of matrimonial law and
more particularly custody or visitation, the increase in mobility has created major

problems." Id.
2. Robin Jo Frank, Comment, American and InternationalResponses to International Child Abductions, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 415, 415-17 (1984).
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litigated by the parties in other forums.'
To combat these problems, representatives from twenty-nine nations4
met in October 1980 at the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Convention

on Private International Law and unanimously approved the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Hague Convention or Convention).5 In 1988, Congress enacted the
Hague Convention for the United States by passing the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).6
The Hague Convention's objective is to restore the custody arrangement to its status before the abduction. The Convention accomplishes its
goal through "the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State." 8 Ideally, under the Convention,

3. Id.
4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10498
(1986) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The 29 nations at the convention were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Arab Republic
of Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id. at 1501.
5. Although all 29 nations approved the Convention, each must deposit an instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands before the Convention will enter into force in the approving
nation. Id. art. 37. Article 38 of the Convention provides that nations other than the 29
that originally approved the Convention also may accede in the same manner, with the
Convention entering into force on the first day of the third calendar month following
deposit of the instrument. Id. art. 38. At this time, 19 of the Convention's original 29
signatories have ratified the Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the

United States, and Yugoslavia. Belize, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Hungary, Mexico, New
Zealand, Poland, and South Africa, which were not original signatories, have recently
ratified the Convention. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST,
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IC-35, 37 (1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST].

6. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1988)
[hereinafter ICARA].

7. E. Prez-Vera, Hague Conference on the PrivateInternationalLaw, Convention
on the Civil Aspects of InternationalChild Abduction: Convention and Recommendation adopted by the Fourteenth Session and ExplanatoryReport 14/426, 17/429 [hereinafter Prez-Vera Report]. Elisa Prez-Vera was the official Hague Conference Reporter for the Convention, and her explanatory report is recognized as the official history
of and commentary on the Convention.
8. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
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courts should refrain from rendering a judgment on the merits of the
custody dispute and merely return the child to the place of habitual residence to permit the courts in that jurisdiction to adjudicate custody matters.' The Hague Convention, however, does provide certain limited exceptions to the prompt return of the child."0 If courts invoke the
Convention's exceptions too frequently, they will defeat the Convention's
purpose of allowing the courts in the jurisdiction of the child's habitual
residence to decide the merits of the custody dispute.
This Note examines the circumstances in which the Convention's exceptions are used and should be used by courts. In Part II, the Note
discusses the scope of the Hague Convention, the drafters' objectives, and
the Convention's implementation procedures. Part III examines the Convention's application by United States courts. Part IV describes the various exceptions to the Hague Convention and explains how United States
courts have applied these exceptions. Finally, Part V addresses the potential for violations of due process when United States courts apply the
Hague Convention. The Note concludes that courts must be willing to
invoke the Article 20 exception in order to protect the due process rights
of both parents and children.
II.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction has two primary objectives: (1) to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to, or retained in, any Contracting State;
and (2) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of
one Contracting State are enforced effectively in the other Contracting
States." The need for the application of the Convention arises when an

9. Pirez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 18/340.
10. Hague Convention, supra note 4, arts. 13, 20.
11. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. Each Contracting State must establish a
Central Authority that serves as a clearinghouse for processing claims under the Convention. Id. arts. 6-10. President Reagan designated the Office of Citizens Consular Services
in the State Department, Bureau of Consular Affairs, as the United States Central Authority. Exec. Order No. 12,648, 3 C.F.R. 579 (1988), reprinted in 24 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1038 (Aug. 11, 1988). See Dana R. Rivers, Comment, The Hague International Child Abduction Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act: Closing Doors to the ParentAbductor, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 589, 632 (1989). According to Article 7 of the Convention, the Central Authority must "take all appropriate
measures" to find an abducted child. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 7. The drafters wanted to be flexible in allowing each Central Authority enough room to act within
the law of the state in which it operated while still working within the spirit of the duty
of cooperation imposed by the Convention. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 41/453.
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adult attempts to establish artificial jurisdictional links to the state to
which the child has been abducted to help obtain custody of the child. 2
Specifically, the Hague Convention targets situations in which one parent flees with the child to the parent's native state or state of preferred
residence, hoping to gain an advantage in a custody hearing over the
child.' 3
By requiring the automatic return of the child without considering the
child's best interests, the Convention seeks to prevent authorities in the
requested state from making value judgments about the state and culture
from which the child has been snatched.' 4 Thus, the international abductor derives no legal advantage from the abduction to or retention in another Contracting State."5 In extraordinary circumstances, however, the
Convention offers affirmative defenses to the return of the child."6

When a court orders that a child be returned to the child's habitual
residence, it makes no determination regarding custody. 17 Some states,

Thus, the Convention permits each Contracting State to determine the duties of its own
Central Authority. Id. Additional general responsibilities of the Central Authority include protecting the child from harm, exchanging social background information regarding the child when appropriate, providing general legal information on the law of its
State, initiating judicial proceedings, facilitating or providing legal aid when appropriate,
providing administrative arrangements for the safe return of the child, and maintaining
contact with other Central Authorities in order to carry out the policies of the Convention. Rivers, supra, at 628-29. See Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal, Hague International Child Abduction Convention, Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494,
10511-513 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis]. When a court finds that a wrongful removal has occurred, then the refuge state must demand that the abducting party immediately return the child to its habitual residence. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12.
12. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 16/428.
13. See, e.g., Renovales v. Roosa, No. FA910392232S, 1991 WL 204483 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991) (mother, a United States citizen, retained children in Connecticut following a traditional family vacation, although family had been living in Spain and
father remained in Spain).
14. See Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 19/431. Situations involving abductions
to and from states with radically different values and views on child custody will give rise
to the most use and abuse of the Convention's exceptions. Id.
15. Id. The principle implicit in the Convention is that any debate on the merits of
the custody rights should occur before authorities in the state that was the child's habitual residence prior to the abduction. Id. at 18/430.
16. See, e.g., Renovales, 1991 WL 204483, at *2. The Convention's exceptions are

discussed infra, part IV.
17. Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10495. The Hague Convention specifically
states that "[a] decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall
not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue." Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 19. See also Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517, 522 (Sup. Ct.
1989) (New York court did not permit the father to challenge a foreign custody decree,
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however, have refused to sign the Convention because they believe that it
may not always be in the abducted child's best interests to be returned."'
These states believe that long term custody questions should be decided
within their own jurisdictions.19 Thus, they refuse to sign the Convention and find themselves becoming havens for child abductors.20
For the Convention to apply, the circumstances of the abduction must

fulfill several requirements. First, the Convention only applies between
two or more Contracting States, and the child must have habitually resided in the Contracting State from which he was abducted.2 1 Second,
both Contracting States must have implemented the Convention before
the wrongful removal or retention. 2 Third, the child must have been
wrongfully removed or retained.2 3 Neither the parents nor the child must
meet any nationality requirements for the Convention to apply, nor must
they be citizens of the state in which they live or to which the child has
been abducted.24 Once the child turns sixteen, however, the Convention

but emphasized that it was not making a determination on custody by returning the child
to the United Kingdom.)
18. Israel Adopts Convention on Child Abduction, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 3, 1991.
Israel, in particular, hesitated to create a situation which would obligate the Israelis to
return a Jewish child to another country. Id.; see also Is Israel a Haven for ChildAbductors, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 9, 1990. Israel was reluctant to ratify the Convention because of the Convention's perceived emphasis on the rights of the parents. Id.
Israel argued that Israeli law viewed the child's best interests, rather than the parents'
rights, as the deciding factor.Id. Israel's legislature, the Knesset, adopted the Convention
when its members realized that there were many more Israeli parents who sought the
return of their Jewish children who had been kidnapped and taken abroad than there
were foreign Jewish parents who used Israel as a haven for abductions. Id.
19. For example, because Muslims consider the father the primary parent, Muslim
countries seldom cooperate in returning abducted children. Fighting the Child Snatchers,
INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 3, 1990, at 11. Muslim fathers may be genuinely distressed about their children's futures in single-parent homes in foreign states, particularly
Western states. Id. However, in accordance with Muslim beliefs, they justify the abduction of a child into a Muslim state as being in the child's best interests. Id. Burkina
Faso, a small Middle-Eastern state, recently broke this trend by becoming the first Muslim state to ratify the Hague Convention. Turning point: A Story of Struggle and
Change, GAZETTE (Montreal), Dec. 14, 1992, at D3.

20. Is Israel a Haven for Child Abductors, supra note 18.
21. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
22. Id. art. 35.
23. Id. art. 3. "The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful
where - (a) it is in breach of rights of custody ... under the law of the State in which
the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at
the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised . . ." Id. See also

Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10503 (defining "wrongful removal").
24. See Swiss Citizen Living in U.S. Must Return Child to New York. Aubrey v.
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ceases to apply, even if the wrongful removal or retention took place
before the child reached the age of sixteen.2 5 Finally, if more than a year
passes between the abduction and the commencement of legal proceedings, then the court may deny the child's return to the state of habitual
26
residence if it appears that the child has become settled in a new home.
Because the Convention applies only between states that have implemented it, the Convention founders when a parent removes a child to a
state that is not a contracting member. In one instance, a mother abducted her daughter to Poland, then a non-Contracting State, despite the
fact that the father had legal custody in the United Kindgom Under
Article 35, the father could do nothing until the mother moved the child
to a country that had signed the Convention. s Once the mother brought
the girl to the United States, the father applied for her return under the
29
Convention, and New Jersey honored his request.

III.

APPLICATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION IN THE UNITED

STATES
Few United States courts have decided cases involving the Hague
Convention." ° In David S. v. Zamira S., 3' the court set out the various
standards of proof required by the Convention, pursuant to the InternaAubrey, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 21.
25. Id. No real dispute arose over this age limit even though it is a more restrictive
concept of "the child" than that accepted by other Hague Conventions. The drafters
reasoned that "a person of more than sixteen years of age generally has a mind of his
own which cannot easily be ignored either by one or both of his parents, or by a judicial
or administrative authority." Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 38/450.
26. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12.
27. Little-Known Treaty Is Invoked in Custody Fight, N.J. L.J., Mar. 7, 1991, at 3
(discussing Gregory Lauder-Frost v. Joanna Lauder-Frost, FD-16-3525-91, decided
Feb. 11, 1991). The mother left her husband in the United Kingdom and moved with the
couple's one year old daughter to the mother's native country of Poland. The father
visited the daughter numerous times in Poland, but he could not bring her back to the
United Kingdom because Poland was not obligated to honor the British custody order.
Id. Poland was not a signatory to the Hague Convention at the time of the abduction,
but has signed the Convention recently. See INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, supra note
5, at 37.
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. Once the father located his daughter in New Jersey, the matter was resolved
within four days. Little-Known Treaty is Invoked in Custody Fight, supra note 27, at 3.
30. When courts have applied the Convention, they have dealt only with issues such

as whether a child was "wrongfully removed" within the definition of the Convention or
whether any of the Article 13 exceptions apply.
31. 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Faro. Ct. 1991) (mother's removal of child from Canada was
wrongful when the husband had an equal right to custody).
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tional Child Abduction Remedies Act. 32 For a court to apply the Convention, the petitioner first must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the removal was wrongful.3 If the petitioner succeeds, then
the respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
child should not be returned under the exceptions in Article 13(b) or
Article 20 to prevent return of the child.34 Under the exceptions in Article 12 and Article 13(a), the respondent only has to prove by 3a5 preponderance of the evidence that the child should not be returned.
Determining which country is the child's habitual residence and
whether the parent wrongfully removed the child can be a difficult
task.3 6 Friedrichv. Friedrich3 1 exemplifies this difficulty.3 8 In Friedrich,
a mother took her son from Germany to the United States a few days
after the mother and father informally separated. In a heated argument, the father told the mother to leave the apartment, and he pro-

32. Id. at 431-32 (construing ICARA, supra note 6).
33. ICARA, supra note 6, § 11603(e)(1)(A); Hague Convention, supra note 4, art.
3; David S., 574 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
34. See, e.g., Renovales v. Roosa, No. FA 910392232 S, 1991 WL 204483 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991) (required clear and convincing evidence that the children
would be subject to grave risk of harm if they were returned to their father, whom the
mother claimed abused the boys); Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521 (Sup. Ct.
1989) (requiring clear and convincing evidence showing that return would pose a grave
risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm or that child would be placed in an
intolerable situation).
35. ICARA, supra note 6, § 11603(e)(2)(B); David S., 574 N.Y.S.2d at 432. Article
12 of the Convention provides that if proceedings under the Convention commence more
than one year from the date of the child's removal, then the Central Authority may
refuse to return the child if parties demonstrate that the child is settled in his new environment. For a further discussion of the exceptions to the automatic return of the child,
see infra part IV.
36. Often, for example, both parents have obtained custody decrees in their native
states. See, e.g., Horlander v. Horlander, 579 N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (father
filed for divorce and custody in Indiana and mother filed in France); Sheikh v. Cahill,
546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (father obtained custody decree in New York and
mother obtained one in the United Kingdom.). The court in David S. raised the interesting question of whether the child could be wrongfully removed if the non-custodial parent had visitation rights but did not have custody. 574 N.Y.S.2d at 429. However, the
court refused to rule on this issue because of the "contemptuous conduct" of the custodial
parent and a subsequent award of equal custody by a Canadian court. Id. at 432.
37. 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993).
38. See id.; see also Mazerole v. Mazerole, No. 30 85 06, 1992 WL 155458 (Conn.
Super, Ct. June 29, 1992) (child who lived in Canada for six months and became a
Canadian citizen was still a "resident" of Connecticut when mother had no intention of
child becoming a Canadian citizen).
39. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1399 (6th Cir. 1993).
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ceeded to move her belongings-along with their child's-into the hallway. 40 The trial court found that the mother did not wrongfully remove
her son because at the time of removal the son was a "habitual resident"
of the United States,4 1 and that by placing the son's belongings in the
hallway, the father relinquished his custody rights over his son.' 2
The appellate court overturned the trial court's ruling, noting that the
Convention narrowly defined the term "wrongful removal," leaving no
room for ad hoc determinations or balancing of the equities.43 Under
Article 3 of the Convention, a removal is wrongful if it violates the custody rights granted to a parent by a court in the state of the child's
habitual residence. 4 ' The parent also must be exercising its custody right
45
at the time of removal.
Thus, the court had to determine the "habitual residence" of the child
to decide if the parent wrongfully removed the child. Neither the Convention nor United States case law defined "habitual resident." 46 A person can have only one habitual residence, regardless of citizenship.' 7 The
Friedrich court emphasized that courts should not look at the parent's
future intentions to determine habitual residence, but rather to the
child's past. 4 The appellate court explained that changes in parental
affection and responsibility do not alter habitual residence. 49 According
to the court, to allow anything other than geography and the passage of

40. Id.
41. Id. at 1398. The child was a United States citizen, had been to the United States,
and the mother intended to return there to live permanently. Id.
42. Id. at 1400.

43. Id.
44.

Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 3. See supra note 23 for the text of Article

3.

45. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
46. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F. 2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993). British courts,
however, have found that no real difference exists between habitual residence and ordinary residence and have cautioned against turning the phrase into a term of art with so
many technicalities that it undermines the purpose of the Convention. Id. at 1401 (referring to In re Bates, No. CA 122.89, High Court of Justice Family Div'n Ct., Royal Ct.
of Justice, United Kingdom (1989)).
47. Id. The court distinguished habitual residence, a factual determination, from
domicile, a matter of law. Id.
48. Id. The court rejected as sufficient evidence of habitual residence the mother's
argument that she intended to return to the United States with her son when she was
discharged from the military. Id.
49. Id. at 1402. Mrs. Friedrich contended that her son's habitual residence changed
from Germany to the United States when his German father removed the child's belongings from the apartment and the mother, a United States citizen, became the primary
caretaker. Id.

874

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 26.865

time to alter the habitual residence would undermine the purpose of the
Convention and permit parents simply to characterize the child's abduction or wrongful removal as an alteration of habitual residence." °
United States courts have made an effort to apply the exceptions to the
Convention when necessary, while maintaining the overall spirit of the
Convention and its objective of returning abducted children. The courts
have required clear and convincing proof that the exceptions apply and
have relied on a restrictive definition of the Convention's terms. Nonetheless, the exceptions provide opportunity for abuse of the Convention
by courts and should be examined in more detail to prevent abuses.
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION

A.

Provisions of Exceptions

The Convention includes exceptions to enable judges to refuse to return a child under certain circumstances. 51 However, these exceptions do
not apply automatically, nor do they impose any affirmative duties upon
judges. 52 Although these exceptions were crucial to the Convention's ratification, the drafters of the Convention recognized that any exception to
the immediate return of the child had to be drawn narrowly. 53 In particular, the drafters hoped to avoid having one country refuse to return a
child because of its subjective value judgments of another country.5
Moreover, the drafters feared that broad exceptions could undermine the
express purpose of the Convention and render it ineffective.5 5
Articles 13 and 20 of the Convention contain the exceptions to the
return of the child. Article 13 allows the petitioned state not to return
the child if the party opposing the return proves that (1) custody rights

were not being exercised by the requesting party at the time the child
50. Id. Although the court concluded that ties with the United States were sufficient
for legal residence, the ties were still not strong enough to establish habitual residence
within the meaning of the Convention. Id. Rather, the court focused on the child's customary residence prior to removal. Id.
51. Nrez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 48/460.
52. Id.
53. Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10509. The Convention might never have been
adopted without the inclusion of Article 20, in particular. Some states thought the exception was necessary for extreme circumstances not covered by Article 13. Id. at 10510.
54. Id.
55. Id. The drafters believed that courts would fulfill the Convention's objectives by
applying the exceptions only in clearly meritorious cases, where the person objecting to
the return has met the burden of proof. Id.; see also discussion of Convention's purpose,
supra, part II.
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was wrongfully removed or retained, or the requesting party consented
to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention;5 6 or (2) there
is a grave risk that return of the child would expose the child to physical
or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 57 Article 13 also gives courts the discretion to refuse to return the
child if the child objects to his return and the court finds that he has
reached an age and degree of maturity that would make it appropriate to
consider his views. 8
Under Article 20, a court may refuse to return a child if return would
"violate the fundamental principles of the requested state relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. ' 59 This final exception represents a compromise by the signatory parties over whether
the Convention should include a "public policy" exception. 0 Because the
scope of public policy provisions is difficult to define and policies vary
among states, public policy provisions are unusual in conventions involving private international law."1 As a result, this exception has proven the
most difficult and the most controversial to apply.
B.

Application of Article 13 by United States Courts

United States courts consistently have interpreted Article 13's exceptions narrowly and have hesitated to invoke them to prevent the immediate return of the child. In narrowly construing this Article, courts have
questioned what type of evidence should be permitted in an Article 13
inquiry. Recently, a New Jersey state court considered whether it should
take into account the child's best interests in an Article 13 proceeding. In
Tahan v. Duquette, 2 a father moved his child to the United States,
away from the custody of the mother in Quebec. Because a previous
appellate court had determined that the child's habitual residence was
Quebec,"2 the court held that the father had to return him to Quebec for
56. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(a).
57. Id. art. 13(b).
58. Id. art. 13. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10496 (Secretary of State
George Schultz's letter submitting the Convention to the United States Senate and
presenting an overview of the Convention's"provisions).
59. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 20.
60. See Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 21/433. The Commission rejected other
formulations before settling on this one. Id. at 22/434. See discussion infra note 81.

61.

Id.

62. 613 A.2d 486 (N. J. Super. App. Div. 1992).
63. See Duquette v. Tahan, 600 A.2d 472 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1991). On the
first appeal, the court held that the Hague Convention applied and remanded the case
for the limited purpose of determining whether any of the exceptions to the Convention
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custody proceedings.6 4 The father protested that the appellate court
should allow the child to remain with him pursuant to Article 13(b),
which concerns the physical or psychological harm of placing the child in
an intolerable situation.6 5
Earlier, the New Jersey trial court had ruled that an inquiry into the
physical or psychological harm of returning a child to the home state
should not cover factual material more suited for the plenary custody
hearing in the child's home state. 6 The trial court interpreted the Convention to require that a court focus exclusively on the jurisdiction involved rather than on the individuals in an Article 13(b) inquiry. 67 The
trial court stated the belief that the Convention reserved jurisdiction over
factual inquiries regarding custody issues to the courts of the child's habitual residence.68
The New Jersey appellate court agreed that factual evidence such as
psychological profiles of the child and parents or other evidence regarding the nature and quality of lifestyle and relationships weighed heavily
on the determination of custody, 6' and thus should be left to the determination of the home jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the appellate court determined that Article 13(b) clearly required more than a cursory evaluation
of the home jurisdiction's civil stability and its availability to decide the
matter. 70 The appellate court recognized that the court in the petitioned
state should have the power to evaluate the surroundings to which the
child is to be sent and the basic personal qualities of the child's caretakers without necessarily delving into complex psychological issues, parenting qualities, or life experiences. 7 ' The court thought that to preclude

applied. Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 488 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992).
64. Tahan, 613 A.2d at 488.
65. Id. Article 13(b) provides that the court does not have to return the child if
"there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." Hague Convention,
supra note 4, art. 13(b).
66. Tahan, 613 A.2d at 488. The trial judge reasoned that to consider that type of
information would "usurp the jurisdictional prerogatives reserved by the Convention to
the courts of Quebec." Id. at 488-89.
67. Id. at 489. The trial court suggested limiting the Article 13(b) inquiry to an
examination of the internal strife or unrest in the jurisdiction that might place the child
at risk. Id.
68. Id. at 488-89.
69. Id. at 489.
70. Id. The court believed that if the Convention's drafters intended the trial court's
restrictive interpretation of Article 13(b) requirements, they would have stated that intention more clearly. Id.
71. Id.
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any focus on the people involved would be too narrow and mechanical. 2
The Convention supports the New Jersey appellate court's interpretation, declaring in the last paragraph of Article 13 that the judicial and
administrative authorities may consider information regarding the social
background of the child. 3
On the other hand, a Connecticut court willingly evaluated evidence
regarding psychological profiles, family relationships and structure, and
the father's abusiveness in Renovales v. Roosa 4 The court permitted
each parent to introduce expert psychological evidence on the anticipated
effect on the children if they were returned to Spain, the place of habitual residence.7 5 The court focused on the necessity of providing clear and
convincing evidence that the children would be subject to a grave risk of
physical or psychological harm, or placed in an intolerable situation. 6 In
practice, therefore, Article 13 gives courts leeway to examine factors regarding the child's best interests, despite the urgings of the Convention's
drafters not to do so. Neither the Roosa opinion nor the Tahan opinion
indicates why the courts reached different interpretations of the Convention and the evidence admissible in an Article 13 inquiry.
C. Purpose and Application of Article 20
Petitioners have had even less success invoking Article 20 than Article
13.7 The Convention's drafters limited the Article 13 exceptions to a
factual consideration of the child's interests in the hopes of prohibiting
one state from making a strict value judgment of another state.78 Some

72. Id. The court, however, did not provide any strict guidelines regarding which
evidence should be examined and which should not, although it did suggest that determinations of psychological make-up, parenting qualities, and the impact of life experiences

should be excluded. Id.
73.

Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13.

74. No. FA 910392232 S, 1991 WL 204483 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991). In
Roosa, the mother refused to return the children, claiming that the father's abusiveness

caused them to suffer grave harm. Id. at *2. The mother alleged that the father was both
physically and psychologically abusive of the oldest son, hitting him and forcing him to
eat excessively until he developed a vomiting reaction and began having nightmares. Id.
She assumed that the father would treat the youngest son the same once he was older. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at *3.
77. Article 20 provides that "[t]he return of the child under the provision of Article
12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms."
Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 20.
78. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 22/434. Article 13 permits a factual examination, although United States courts have differed on the extent of factual evidence
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contracting states, however, felt that another exception was necessary to
cover extreme circumstances not covered by Article 13.11 Other states

worried that such an exception would be interpreted so broadly that it
would undermine the Convention's purpose.8 0 Thus, in light of the diminished role of the internal law of the refugee state under the Convention, Article 20 represents a compromise among the drafters."'
In order to invoke Article 20, the Central Authority in the petitioned
state must demonstrate that returning the child would violate the state's
protective principles of human rights.8 2 The drafters designed Article 20
to apply only in the most extreme circumstances.8 3 The drafters of the
Convention adamantly insisted that the public policy exception should be
limited to principles accepted by the law of the requested state, either
through internal legislation, customary international law, or treaties.8 4
To refuse the return of a child, the petitioned state must show that its
"fundamental principles" prohibit the return. 5 The simple fact that the
return would be manifestly incompatible with these principles will not
suffice.8 8 Courts must balance this exception with a mutual respect for
the cultural differences among states that often provide the foundation
for family law in each state.8 7 States should avoid invoking Article 20's

allowed. See supra part IV.B.
79. Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10510.
80. Id.
81. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 22/434. Originally, the Article 20 exception
read that contracting states could refuse to return the child if that return would be "manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law relating to the family and
children in the state addressed." Id. at 22/434. This formulation was rejected because it
implicitly permitted the refusal to return the child to be based on purely legal arguments
arising from the internal law of the requested state. Id. The emphasis on the internal
law of a contracting state found in the original Article 20 was at first a source of serious
disagreement among the delegates to the Convention. Id. However, the delegates ultimately agreed that the new formulation provided "the surest guarantee of the success of
the Convention." Id.
82. Id.
83. Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10510. The text of the Legal Analysis says the
provision should be invoked only on the "rare occasion that return of a child would
utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend all notions of due process." Id. Even
without this explicit exception in the Convention, many states would have been bound by
their individual constitutions to follow such a rule. A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention
on International Child Abduction, 30 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 537, 551 (1981).

84. PNrez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 50/462.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. John M. Eekelaar, InternationalChild Abduction by Parents, 32 U. TORONTO
L.J. 281, 314 (1982). Eekelaar recognizes that family law in different states reflects
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exception simply because one state operates a system of preferred custody
of one parent over the other.8 8
The drafters of the Convention recognized the potential for abuse of
Article 20 and hoped that in practice its application would be consistent
and limited. To give effect to these goals of the drafters, experts on the
Convention have suggested that courts impose two limiting factors on
Article 20:
(1) the return of the child must violate an actual law of the requested
country rather than merely be incompatible with the country's policies or
culture, and (2) a country should not invoke the public policy exception in

applying the Convention any more frequently than it does in its own domestic judicial decisions."9
Without these limitations, the provision would permit discriminatory application, violating one of the most widely recognized fundamental principles in internal laws.9" With the application of these limiting factors,
however, automatically returning the child under the Convention may
deprive both the parent and the child of due process. Therefore, the
Hague Convention could conflict with United States Constitutional
guarantees.
V.

DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION IN
THE UNITED STATES

A.

United States Courts Look to ICARA for Internal Law

The limiting factors of Article 20 require the violation of an actual
law of the requested state before that state may invoke Article 20. The
United States, however, has not expressed specifically which internal
laws should be relied on when applying Article 20. As the implementing
legislation for the Hague Convention, the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act serves as a source of internal law. For example, in the
recent case of Klam v. Klam,9 1 a federal district court looked to ICARA
for the applicable United States law in applying the Hague Convention.
cultural patterns. Understandably, the determination of a child's future should be based
on the cultural practices of the child's home state. Concern arises when these practices
will affect the child's future exercise of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.
This is the situation to which the Article 20 exception is addressed. Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.; see also Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10510.
Rivers, supra note 11, at 628.
Pfrez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 50/462.
797 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. N.Y. 1992).
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In Klam, a German citizen petitioned the court for a warrant in lieu of
habeas corpus, requesting that his children, who had been living with
their mother in New York, be brought before the court for proceedings
pursuant to the Hague Convention.9 2 According to ICARA, "[niotice of
an action ... shall be given in accordance with the applicable law governing notice in interstate child custody proceedings." 93
ICARA further provides that no court may "order a child removed
from a person having physical control of the child unless the applicable
requirements of State law are satisfied." 9' 4 In the United States, interstate child custody proceedings fall within the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),9 5 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention

Act (PKPA).9 Each of these Acts instructs that, before any decision may
be made on child custody, "reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard shall be given" to the parties. 7 Thus, to satisfy the Constitution's
due process requirements, these statutes give both sides the opportunity
to be heard in a plenary hearing regarding the best interests of the
child. 8

B.

UCCJA: Requirements of Due Process

UCCJA is the internal legislation which would have the most impact
on Article 20 motions because it addresses the jurisdiction of courts to
decide custody disputes." Before Congress enacted UCCJA, the United
States Supreme Court decided in May v. Anderson' that a custody

92. Id. at 203.
93. ICARA, supra note 6, § 11603(c).
94. Id. § 11604(a)-(b); see also Klam, 797 F. Supp. at 206 (German father did not
make a sufficient showing under State law to have the children removed from their
mother in New York).
95. 9 U.L.A. 123 (1968) [hereinafter UCCJA].
96, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980) [hereinafter PKPA]. The PKPA could be considered
a United States internal version of the Hague Convention. The Act requires states of the
United States to enforce child custody determinations made by courts of other states. Id.
%(a). A court must recognize the determination of another court only if that court had
jurisdiction under the law of the state in which it is located. Id. (c)(1).

97. UCOJA, supra note 95, § 4; PKPA, supra note 96, § 1738A(e); see also Klam,
797 F. Supp. at 205 (noting that the UCCJA and the PKPA provisions on notice are
substantially similar and therefore relying on both).
98. Klam, 797 F. Supp. at 205; see also In the Matter of the Application of Felix

C., 455 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
99.

Pfrez-Vera Report, supra note 7, at 22/434.

100. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). In May, the parents separated and the mother took the
children from Wisconsin to Ohio with the consent of her husband. Id. at 530. After a
few weeks, she informed her husband that she would not return to Wisconsin, at which
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hearing required either in personam jurisdiction over an absent parent or
minimum contacts between that parent and the forum state.'0 1 When it
drafted UCCJA, Congress turned its back on the due process ramifications of May v. Anderson and instead regarded custody jurisdiction as in
rem jurisdiction."0 2 Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court
has moved toward greater procedural protection for both non-resident
10 4
parties' 03 and parental rights.
Under the Hague Convention and ICARA, proceedings do not consider the merits of the custody suit, but only determine whether the child

time he filed suit inWisconsin seeking both an absolute divorce and custody of the children. Id. The wife was personally served with a summons and petition, but made no
appearance at the Wisconsin hearing. Id. at 530-31. The wife later contested the validity
of the Wisconsin custody decree, which awarded custody of the children to the husband,
on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over the wife. Id. at 529, 531. Relying
on the Wisconsin decree, the husband filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to have

the children returned to him. Id. at 532.
101. A plurality of the Court in May held that an ex parte custody decree could not
be enforced against an absent parent unless the court had in personam jurisdiction over
that parent. Id. at 534. Although the opinion in May is rather murky, many scholars say
that its "only logical construction" is that due process requires in personam jurisdiction
over both parents. Helen Garfield, Due Process Rights of Absent Parents in Interstate
Custody Conflicts: A Commentary In re Marriage of Hudson, 16 IND. L. REv. 445
(1983); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Supreme Court Faces the Family, FAM.
ADvoc., SUMMER 1982, at 20, 22; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., May v. Anderson: Preamble
to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 379, 383-84 (1959).
102. Garfield, supra note 101, at 446.
103. Id. at 468; see, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (both holding that minimum contacts are now required for
all types of suits). In Kulko, the mother signed an agreement in New York giving custody of the children to their father. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 87. She lived in California and
the children visited her on vacations. Id. The mother later commenced an action in California to modify the custody decree. Id. at 88. The children's father appeared specially,
protesting that he did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California for the California court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over him. Id. The United States Supreme Court decided that any exercise of jurisdiction over the father by the California
courts would violate due process. Id. at 91. The court held that the mere fact that the
father sent his daughter to California to live with the mother was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts. Id. at 101.
104. Garfield, supra note 101, at 468; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388
(1982) (no parent can have parental rights terminated without the opposing party's
meeting the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father has due process right to a hearing before being deprived
of the custody of his children). Although United States courts have deemed a parent's
interest in custody of a child to be fundamental, this interest is not immune from state
intervention. Care and Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.d 993, 997 (Mass. 1990).
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was wrongfully abducted or retained.' However, under UCCJA the
hearings may actually determine who will have custody of the child.' 0 6
Under United States due process requirements, parties to a custody hearing must have notice and an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings. 107 Thus, because the Convention proceedings determine only
whether the child has been wrongfully removed or retained,'0 8 the Convention does not gurantee a custody hearing which meets due process
requirements.
Although UCCJA permits a court to make a decision on the merits of
a child custody case, courts have not gone as far as interpreting UCCJA
as allowing this jurisdiction under the Hague Convention. In one New
Jersey case, the mother of the child abducted her daughter from the

105. Hague
§ 11601(a)(4).

Convention,

supra note 4, art.

19; ICARA, supra note

6,

106. See UCCJA, supra note 95, §§ 1, 4. Under UCCJA, a state has jurisdiction to
allow its courts to determine custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the
commencement of the proceedings, or was the home state within the preceding six
months and the parent continues to reside there, (2) it is in the child's best interest for
that court to decide custody, (3) the child is physically present in the state and was
abandoned or (4) it appears that no other state has jurisdiction. Id. § 4.
107. In Stanley v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that a
parent has a due process right to a hearing before custody issues are determined. 405
U.S. 645 (1972). Furthermore, the Court held that to deny a parent a hearing is to deny
equal protection of the laws when all other parents whose custody is challenged receive a
hearing. Id. In Stanley, the children's natural mother died and the state assumed custody
of the children without giving the natural father, who was unwed at the time, any opportunity for a custody hearing. Id. at 646-49. The Court recognized that a parent's interest
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children warrants more
deference and protection than a mere economic liberty or property interest. Id. at 651.
Earlier, the Court had declared that the rights to conceive and raise one's children were
"[r]ights far more precious . .. than property rights." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,
533 (1953); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to decide child's
education); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). The Court
held denying unwed fathers a fitness hearing that was accorded to all other parents
whose custody was challenged constituted a denial of equal protection. Stanley, 405 U.S.
at 651. In addition to protection under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court has also protected the integrity of the
family unit under the Ninth Amendment, recognizing that certain fundamental personal
rights are protected by the Constitution even though they are not explicitly set forth. Id.;
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(noting that the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes that "there are fundamental personal rights such as [procreation], which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.").
108. The Convention defines wrongful removal and retention very narrowly. See
Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
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United Kingdom to New Jersey, and argued that New Jersey had a
vested interest in the case under UCCJA and that custody should be
decided under New Jersey law.' 0 9 The judge found, however, that the
Hague Convention pre-empts UCCJA. 0 Because British courts had
awarded custody to the father, the New Jersey court refused to interfere
and ordered that the child be returned to the United Kingdom to live
with her father."'
UCCJA and the Convention also conflict because UCCJA requires
that the absent parent receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard."' Section 4 of UCCJA provides that parties must have reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before any decree may be
made.1 3 Notice may be given by personal service,"" by mail," 5 or as
directed by the court," 6 which in certain circumstances may include
publication." 7 Whether the parties have had the opportunity to be heard
presents the real problems in reconciling the requirement of UCCJA
with the demands of the Convention. Under UCCJA, the custody decree's validity turns on whether proper notice was given, but the Convention does not make an issue of notice requirements.
In Horlanderv. Horlander,"8 the court found that under UCCJA, a
state must recognize a custody decree of a foreign nation only if all affected parties received reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard." 9 In this case, a wife who had been living in Indiana moved with
her children to her native country of France and filed for divorce and
custody of the children.' At about the same time, her husband began
similar proceedings in Indiana.' 2 ' The parties disputed whether the

109. Little-Known Treaty Is Invoked in Custody Fight, supra note 27 (discussing
Gregory Lauder-Frost v. Joanna Lauder-Frost, FD-16-3525-91, decided Feb. 11, 1991).
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. UCCJA, supra note 95, § 4.
113. Id. "Before making a decree... reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child." Id.

114. Id. § 5(a)(1)-(2).
115. Id. § 5(a)(3).
116. Id. § 5(a)(4).
117. Id. § 5.
118. 579 N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
119. UCCJA, supra note 95, § 23; Horlander,579 N.E.2d at 96. The court relied
on the intent of the original drafters of the UCCJA as expressed in their comments. Id.
120. Horlander, 579 N.E.2d at 93.
121. Id. The children had been born and spent all of their lives in Indiana. The
father still lived there. Id.
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courts in Indiana or in France had subject matter jurisdiction over the
custody determination. 2 Because the French court had not rendered a
decree giving the father notice or an opportunity to be heard, Indiana
12 3
courts were not bound to recognize the French ruling.
The appellate court in Horlanderdecided that the trial court abused
its discretion and violated UCCJA's policy when it found France to be a
more convenient forum. 2 4 The appellate court refused to examine
whether the trial court's findings violated the Hague Convention's policy. "2' 5 The Horlander opinion indicates that if the French court had
issued a custody decree and had not given the father appropriate due
process consideration, then the court would not have returned the child
under the Convention. This potential conflict between UCCJA and the
Hague Convention may present an appropriate situation for United
States courts to invoke the Article 20 exception.
The Indiana case of In re Marriageof Hudson 26 shows how a decision on jurisdiction can affect a parent's due process rights. In Hudson,
the father forcibly seized and removed his children from the mother and
took them to Spain on the same day that she filed for custody in Indi-

ana. 2 Because these events occurred before the ratification of the Hague
Convention, the Indiana trial court applied UCCJA and awarded custody of the children to the mother.'2 On appeal, the father contended
that the Indiana court did not have jurisdiction over him and thus violated his due process rights by removing custody of his children without
a fair hearing.' 29 The appellate court in Hudson decided that UCCJA
did not require in personam jurisdiction. 3 Therefore, the court did have
122. Id. at 95-96.
123. Id. at 96. Because the French action was pending at the time Horlander instituted the Indiana action, no custody decree had issued. Id. Nonetheless, the Indiana
court indicated that if the French court had awarded custody, and Mr. Horlander had
been given notice and an opportunity to be heard, the Indiana court would be bound to
recognize the French decree. Id. Because the French court had not issued any decree at
all yet, the discussion of whether the court would have recognized a French decree was
purely dicta. See id.
124. Id. at 98-99. "By hot following the act and by incorrectly finding France a
more convenient forum, the Indiana court's dismissal of Karl's petition not only was an
abuse of discretion but also conflicts with the policy of the UCCJA." Id. at 99.
125. Id.
126. 434 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. App. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1202 (1983).
127. Id. at 110. The father was serving in the United States military in Spain at the
time. Id.
128. Id. at 110.
129. Id. at 114.
130. Id. at 119. The court performed an extensive analysis of the jurisdictional re-
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jurisdiction over the father necessary to make the custody ruling, despite
the fact that he did not have the opportunity to be heard.' 3' The fact that
the father had been involved in child-snatching may have facilitated the
132
court's finding that his due process rights were not violated.
In Hudson, the Indiana court proceedings focused on whether the

court had jurisdiction over the absent parent in order to decide custody.
By stretching the limits of jurisdiction, the court could deprive a parent
of custody without necessarily providing him with due process. The primary focus of the Hague Convention is not jurisdiction because the purpose of its proceedings is to determine whether the child was wrongfully
removed, not to determine custody issues. However, the fact that the
court removed custody from the father without giving him an opportunity to be heard bears significantly on the Convention.
Ironically, the holding in Hudson could prove beneficial if an abductor sought refuge with the child in the United States.' 3 3 Under the jurisdictional rules of the UCCJA, the abductor could get a custody ruling
from the state where he established residency that would be binding on
the other spouse as long as the spouse received notice and opportunity to
be heard. 3 The Convention seeks to prohibit these circumstances by
requiring the immediate return of the child to its habitual residence and
by forbidding the abductor to seek a custody hearing. 135 The most interesting situation arises, however, when the abductor seeks a hearing in
the United States because of failure to receive one in the foreign country.
In that case, the United States either would have to deprive the parent of

quirements in custody proceedings in reaching its conclusion. The court reasoned that
"[t]he paramount issue in custody proceedings is the best interest of the child, not the
feuding parents." Id. at 118-19.
131. Id. at 118.

132. See Garfield, supra note 101, at 448. The United States Supreme Court held in
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), that a parent has a due process right to a
custody hearing. In Hudson, however, perhaps because the father had snatched the children away from the mother, the court did not lean over backwards to determine that he

had a due process right to a custody hearing. Although no case such as this has yet come
before the United States Supreme Court, in light of the ruling in Stanley, it seems to be
unlikely that the Court would dismiss the complex due process questions so perfunctorily. The Supreme Court might not be as willing to deny a parent the right to a custody
hearing after it explicitly declared parents had such a right in Stanley.
133. Garfield, supra note 101, at 474.
134. The UCCJA contains a discretionary "clean-hands" provision which allows a
court to decline jurisdiction if child-snatching is involved. UCCJA, supra note 95, § 8.
Because this section is discretionary, the court might take jurisdiction if it liked, in which
case any custody decree would be binding. Garfield, supra note 101, at 474 n.174.
135. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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a child without giving the parent a fair hearing or would have to invoke
an exception to the Convention's requirements. Because of these
problems, some scholars believe that the United States Supreme Court
36
would reject the holding and rationale of Hudson."
The compelling story of Betty Mahmoody and her daughter, Mahtob,
highlights concerns about the Convention. 3 ' In 1984, Mahmoody accompanied her daughter, who had been raised in the United States, and
her Iranian-born husband on what was supposed to be a two-week vacation to Iran. 38 Once in Iran, however, her husband refused to leave.' 39
He informed them that under Islamic law, Mahmoody and her daughter
were Iranian citizens and that he was their absolute master. 40 After
eighteen months, Mahmoody risked execution to escape with her daughter.' 41 At the time, the Hague Convention was not in effect in either the
United States or Iran.' 42 If it had been, Mahmoody's husband could
have requested the immediate return of the child through the Convention. For the past eighteen months his daughter had been a habitual
resident of Iran, and he had exercised his custody rights over her. Thus,
the Convention would have forced Mahmoody to return the child,
forfeiting her rights to a custody hearing and risking death if she at43
tempted to accompany her daughter back to Iran.1
One suggestion put forth for dealing with the jurisdictional and due
process problems of the UCCJA is that any ex parte decree should be
enforced, even against an absent parent, but that the absent parent still
should be entitled to an original custody hearing, rather than a modification hearing.', 4 The advantage of this approach would be to guarantee

136. Garfield, supra note 101, at 475. However, the Supreme Court would have
strong reasons for wanting to uphold a statute as widely adopted and supported as the
UCCJA. Id.
137. Their story was the subject of a book by Mahmoody entitled "Not Without My
Daughter," which was subsequently made into a movie starring Sally Field.
138. Cheryl Cornacchia, Turning point: A Story of Struggle and Change, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Dec. 14, 1992, at D3.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The Convention became effective in the United States in 1988. See ICARA,
supra note 6. Iran still has not signed the Hague Convention. See supra note 4.
143. Betty Mahmoody has formed a support group and parents' network to promote
awareness of international parental abduction and to provide counselling for those who
have been victims. This group may be contacted by writing to One World: For Children,
PO Box 124, Corunna, Mich. 48817, or by phoning (517) 725-2392. M.L. Elrick,
Mother's Mission Behind Screen's 'Daughter', Cm. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1991, at CN1.
144. See Garfield, supra note 101, at 480-481; John J. Sampson, What's Wrong
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each parent the right to an original custody hearing while recognizing
the validity of the ex parte decree.14 5 Thus, if the child has been
snatched, it will be returned to the other parent until a proper custody
hearing can be held.
However, under the Hague Convention the problem remains that both
parties may not receive fair treatment, or even a hearing. If the Convention requires a parent to relinquish custody of the child with full knowledge that the parent will not receive an opportunity to be heard, the
Convention violates the internal law of the United States established by
UCCJA. UCCJA prohibits a child from being removed from parental
custody unless the parent has received notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
Not every international abduction case results in a parent being deprived of due process guarantees. In Sheikh v. Cahill,146 a mother abducted her daughter from the United States to the United Kingdom. The
father then began custody hearings in the United Kingdom, even though
he had a custody decree from the United States.' 41 In so doing, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the British court and had to abide by
its decision.' 48 Significantly, the father still obtained a fair hearing on
custody, even though the result was not in his favor.14 9 Because he had
an opportunity to be heard, no violation of United States law occurred.
The true problems with the Convention arise only when one of the parties never receives an opportunity to be heard in a fair proceeding.
C.

Right of the Child to Remain in the United States

1. Express Preference of a Mature Child
One facet of the due process issue is whether a child has a constitutional right to remain in the United States if the child expresses a desire
not to return to the state of habitual residence. 50 In Bergstrom v. Berg-

with the UCCJA?, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1981, 28, 30. In a modification hearing, the
non-custodial parent bears the burden of proving changed circumstances. Garfield, supra
note 101, at 481. An original custody hearing involves a de novo review of the best
interests of the child. Id.
145. Garfield, supra note 101, at 482.

146. 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
147. See also Alan Kohn, Order Child Returned to Mother in London; International Abduction Pact Interpreted, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1989, at 1.
148.
149.
150.

Sheikh, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
Id.
The Convention addresses this situation in Article 13 which provides that a
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strom, 5 1 a young girl sued to restrain her divorced mother from taking
her to live in Norway. A federal district court in North Dakota held that
a child of eight years and ten months could intelligently exercise her
right as a citizen to remain in the United States, but the Eighth Circuit
52
overturned this decision on other grounds.'
The religious upbringing of the child is often an issue in child custody
cases, and courts often recognize the child's religious convictions as a
valid reason for honoring the child's preference to remain with a particu-

lar parent. Although the First Amendment prohibits a court from preferring the religious convictions of one parent over another, 15 3 a court may
honor the request of a mature child who expresses a custodial preference
based on religious convictions without offending the Establishment
54
Clause.'
2. Children Do Not Have a Fundamental Right to Remain in the
United States
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a citizen child, an
infant born in the United States, was not entitled to a stay of her alien
parents' deportation even though their deportation would deprive her of

court may consider the express preference of a child who has reached an appropriate age
or degree of maturity. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13.
151. 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980).
152. Id. at 519. The Eighth Circuit refused to rule on the constitutional issue of
whether she had a right as a citizen to remain in the United States because it decided
that the custody decision was a factual matter better resolved by the state court. Id. at
520. The court believed that it should avoid ruling on constitutional issues except under
strict necessity. Id. The pending state court claim on custody could alleviate any need for
the federal court to decide the constitutional issue, and thus the issue was not ripe for
adjudication. Id. See also Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 838 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(holding that custody decisions should be made by state courts on factual determinations
rather than by federal courts on constitutional grounds).
153. E.g. Harris v. Harris, 343 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1977) (mother's religious belief in
snake handling was not enough to remove custody of her child when there was no showing that the child would be exposed to being bitten by a snake); Smith v. Smith, 367 P.2d

230 (Ariz. 1961) (en bane) (mother not shown to be unfit for custody because of her
religious beliefs regarding saluting the flag and participating in Christmas plays at
school); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 132 A.2d 420 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957) (father
based claim for custody on antenuptial agreement that said children would be reared in
his religious faith, but court found religious views offered no grounds for removing children from custody of one parent in favor of the other unless the welfare of the child was
at risk); see also Leonard P. Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 15
FAM. L.Q. 259, 334-35 (1982).
154. Strickman, supra note 153, at 335.
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her right as a United States citizen to reside in the United States.15 5 In
this case, Acosta v. Gaffney, the parents, in protesting their deportation
order, argued that their deportation would unconstitutionally deprive
their daughter of the equal protection to which she was entitled as a
United States citizen. 5" The court, however, reasoned that an infant's
right as a citizen to remain in the United States was purely theoretical
because an infant is incapable of exercising such a right. 157 Additionally,
58
the United States Supreme Court held in Hintopoulosv. Shaughnessy1
that alien parents may be deported even though deportation may result
in severe economic detriment to their United States citizen child.' 59
Courts have held that United States citizens have a fundamental right
to reside wherever they wish, whether in the United States or abroad.'6
This right is purely theoretical for a young child because the child would
be incapable of maturely making this decision.' The Third Circuit did
recognize that the parents could permit their daughter to remain in the
United States with foster parents.16 2 This option would be the parents'
decision regarding custody, however, rather than a decision by their
daughter to remain in the United States.' 63

Courts have followed similar reasoning in child custody cases. Most of
these cases turn on whether the child has the ability to make mature
decisions. In Tischendorf v. Tischendorf,' the Minnesota Supreme
Court found that a child did not have an independent constitutional right
to remain in the United States if a custody decree judicially determined
that it would be in the child's best interests to visit his father in Germany.' 65 The court recognized that while children do possess constitu-

155. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977). The parents had overstayed
the period of their authorized visit and were being deported by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Id.
156. Id. at 1155.

157. Id. at 1157.
158. 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
159. Id.; see also Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158.

160. Id. at 1157; see also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (naturalized
United States citizen who lived in Germany for past eight years did not automatically
lose her United States citizenship because native born citizens were free to reside abroad
indefinitely without forfeiting their citizenship); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125
(1958) (citizens may not be denied the right to travel without due process of law, even if
they allegedly have communistic beliefs and associations).
161. Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1157.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 1158.
164.
165.

321 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1982).
Id. The child's mother, who lived in the United States, had custody over the
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tional rights, some of these rights do not become effective until a child
reaches a sufficient age of maturity to exercise them intelligently.' 66 The
dissent in Tischendorf contended that if the boy were not mature enough
to exercise his constitutional rights, then a guardian ad litem should be
67
appointed for him.

In Schleiffer v. Meyers,'68 the Seventh Circuit enforced a Swedish custody decree requiring that a ten-year old American citizen return to
Sweden to live with his mother, who had custody. 6 The court acknowledged that while parents have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children,' 170 children themselves have constitutional
rights independent of their parents' rights. 17 ' However, these rights are
2
not always equivalent to those afforded adults.'1
In Schleiffer, the father had petitioned the Swedish court for a divorce
and was fully represented when the court awarded custody to the
mother. 17 3 In determining the custody issue, the court did not give much

child, and the father, who lived in West Germany, had visitation rights. Id. at 407.
166. Id. at 410; see also Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977) (infant

child had no constitutional right to remain in the United States).
167. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d at 413 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
168. 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1981).
169. This case arose before the Hague Convention came into effect in the United
States in 1988. See ICARA, supra note 6.
170. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 660; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 401 (1923).
171. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 660; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (12
year old boy charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult deserves
the same due process and fair treatment that an adult would receive); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967) (15 year old boy taken into custody for making lewd telephone calls still
had a constitutional guarantee of due process in juvenile hearings).
172. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 660.
173. Id. at 661. In determining whether a hearing to remove a child from parental
custody meets due process standards, courts generally apply the test formulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Care and
Protection of Robert, 556 N.E. 2d 993, 996 (Mass. 1990). In Robert, the court applied
the test set forth in Mathews to a custody case, listing the three factors comprised in the
Mathews test: (1) the private interest that is affected by the official action, (2) the risk of
erroneously depriving a party of such interest through the procedures used, and the likely
value of any additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the Government's interest, such as
the functional, financial, and administrative burdens that the additional procedures
would entail. Id. at 996. Two important aspects of the Mathews test require a determination of the private interest at stake and the risk of erroneously depriving a party of this
interest. Thus, a significant consideration in the due process analysis under these factors
is the permanency of the potential loss. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982)

(finding a balancing of the private interests of a parent in child custody issues "strongly
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weight to the son's expressed desire to reside in the United States."7 4
Because the child retained his United States citizenship, he retained his
freedom to choose his place of residence upon becoming mature enough
to leave his custodial parent."7 5 Also, the court noted that he would be
living in a free country.'7 6 Thus, the court did not find that awarding the
mother custody in Sweden denied the child his constitutional rights.
Although the court did not find that the child had a right to reside in
the United States, he did have a strong claim that forcing his return to
Sweden would amount to a de facto deportation from the United
States. 7' This de facto deportation would violate his constitutional rights
to travel and to choose a residence.17 Although such a right undoubtedly
belongs to adults, the court found that it is not an absolute right for
children.' 79 In a concurring opinion, however, another judge found that
in certain instances a child still deserves constitutional protections even
when affording those protections could subvert the normal parental
role.' Although recognizing that a child's right to constitutional protections at the expense of parental control could produce uncertain results,
the concurrence thought that grave and irrevocable consequences arose in
this case.'

favors heightened procedural protections"). Most often, parental custody in international
cases will not be lost irretrievably because the child always will have the option of returning to the United States when mature enough to make such decisions independently.
Id. at 761.
174. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 662.
175. Id.
176. Id. It is unclear whether the court insinuated here that the decision might have
been different had Sweden not been a "free country." See also Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F.
Supp. 831 (W.D. Pa. 1980). In Zaubi, a Pennsylvania state court refused to rule on the
claimed right of two children as United States citizens to reside within the United States
rather than be removed to Denmark by their mother. Id. The court refused jurisdiction
on the grounds that it would disrupt state policy as set forth in UCOJA. Id. at 836-37.
However, the court did suggest that courts may consider the nation to which the child
would be removed when the child makes a claim to live in the United States. Id. at 837
(citing Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980)).
177. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 662.
178. Id.; see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
179. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 662-63; see Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir.
1977). Courts take solace in the fact that any deportation of the child only
postpones-not completely bars-the child's residency in the United States. See id. at
1158.
180. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 666 (Cudahy, J., concurring); see also Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976), (right of a
pregnant minor to an abortion without parental consent).
181. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 666 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
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Situations in which a custody decision could have grave and irrevocable consequences could exist, however, and may call for courts to exercise
the Article 20 exception to the Hague Convention. For example, sending
an African-American child to South Africa could be a situation in which
the court might be forced to recognize the right of a child to determine
residence. 182 Considering the unstable political situation and frequent occurrences of racial violence in South Africa, a court might have difficulty
justifying sending a young, African-American citizen to be raised there.
Courts might also be more willing to invoke the Article 20 exception
in cases involving child refugees. While there are many benefits that result from determining a child's future based on the cultural practices of
the place of habitual residence, certain circumstances may prevail in a
state that would "seriously endanger his future exercise of basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms, or those of the parent who would accompany him."' 183 These circumstances seem particularly likely in the
case of child refugees. 84 If Article 20 is construed narrowly, some academics say, the child, not the abductor, must be faced with an intolerable
185
situation at home for the Article to apply.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When a child becomes a pawn in an international custody game, the
Hague Convention effectively returns matters to status quo before removal or abduction by returning the child to the country of habitual
residence and allowing the courts there to determine custody matters. As

a deterrent to international abductions, the Convention extinguishes any
legal advantage of removing the child to a potentially friendlier jurisdiction. As with any agreement, situations will arise that call for exceptional responses. The Hague Convention anticipates these instances by
providing certain exceptions. These exceptions endow judges with the
discretion to ignore the confines of the Convention and to act in the perceived best interests of the child. Nonetheless, these exceptions must
strike a balance between allowing authorities sufficient discretion to react

182. South Africa, the Convention's most recent signatory, signed the Hague Convention on January 29, 1993. South Africa Signs InternationalConventions on Social
Issues, Human Rights, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 601.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Anton, supra note 83, at 551. Cf.In re Walter Polovchak, 454 N.E.2d 258
(II. 1983) (court ordered 12 year old boy to return to the Ukraine with his parents,
although the United States Attorney suggested that any decision on final custody respect
the supremacy of the United States obligations under the Refugee Act of 1980).
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to exceptional situations and prohibiting them from making subjective
value judgments on a foreign culture or country.
The Article 13 exceptions seek to provide relief in those factual circumstances in which the child will be placed in grave danger or at risk
of intolerable harm. Often times courts have difficulty distinguishing evidence that leads to a judgment about the child's particular family situation and evidence that leads to a judgment about the culture of the foreign country. The Convention adamantly desires to avoid reliance on the
latter in applying Article 13. However, with judges uncertain about
what evidence they may permit into their courtrooms, parties have flexibility to bring in certain cultural differences disguised as the attributes of
the factual family situation. Therefore, courts must watch closely for
abuse in this area.
The Article 20 exception is surrounded by even more uncertainty than
Article 13. If courts allow parties to invoke Article 20 too frequently,
they will completely undermine the purpose of the Hague Convention.
However, by limiting the exception to the internal law of the country,
any abuse will be curtailed. Arguably, United States internal law centers
around due process requirements. To order the return of a child to a
foreign country, knowing that the parent will not receive an opportunity
to be heard in a custody hearing, blatantly violates the due process requirements of the United States Constitution and statutory law such as
UCCJA. United States courts cannot ignore due process requirements in
order to fulfill the goals of the Hague Convention.
United States internal law requires that a parent receive due process
and a fair opportunity to be heard before the parent loses custody of a
child. The automatic return provisions of the Hague Convention may in
some circumstances violate these rights. The Article 13 exception allows
a court to refuse to return a child when the return would seriously endanger the child's best interests. Courts should be willing to invoke the
Article 20 exception when the parents are in danger of losing their, fundamental rights, as well as their child. The Hague Convention, in its
emphasis on the rights of the child, may trample on the rights of the
parents who have one of the most fundamental interests at
stake-custody of their child. Ideally every country would afford parents
a fair hearing before removing a child, but that is simply not the case.
Thus, United States courts must ensure that its citizens' rights are protected. Courts should not hesitate to invoke the Article 20 exception to
protect the fundamental rights of parents and children to due process.
As part of ICARA, parents should be entitled to a hearing regarding
whether they will receive a fair opportunity to be heard in a foreign
country before the child is returned to that country. Of course, as long as
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parents receive notice and an opportunity to be heard, then courts should
follow the Convention and return the child to its country of habitual
residence for custody proceedings. Due process does not guarantee a parent custody; rather, it guarantees a fair opportunity to be heard in a
custody dispute. Courts must be careful not to confuse valid due process
arguments with value judgments of another country's system of custody.
Nonetheless, if a court finds that a parent will not -receive a custody
hearing, it should refuse to return the child under the Convention and
permit the custody proceedings to be held in a jurisdiction that will give
both parents an opportunity to be heard.
The Hague Convention has given courts discretion to act in the child's
best interests in compelling circumstances. If individuals can show that
they will not receive due process as required by United States law, courts
should exercise the discretion provided to them by Article 20 to ensure
that they receive the protection of human rights and individual freedoms
guaranteed to citizens by the United States Constitution.
Dorothy Carol Daigle

